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Abstract
Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remains a challenge due to hypothetical
bias – the so-called gap between hypothetical monetary values and real economic commit-
ments. The gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate
real commitments or a combination of both. Herein we examine whether the traditional
real-world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation. Applying the social
psychology theory on the oath as a truth-telling-commitment device, we ask our bidders to
swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive-compatible
second-price auction. Results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest the
oath-only auctions outperform all other auctions (real, hypothetical, and real-with-oath).
In our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection, the
oath-only design induced people to treat as binding both their budget constraint (i.e .,
lower values on the high end of the value distribution) and participation constraint (i.e.,
positive values rather than zero bids used to opt out of auction). Our oath-only results are ro-
bust to extra training on the auction and to consequential wording about the reason for the oath.
Keywords: Oath; Commitment ; Vickrey auction ; Hypothetical Bias ;
Induced Values ; Homegrown Values.
JEL Classification: C9; H4; Q5
Résumé
La révélation des préférences des individus à l’égard des biens non-marchands reste une
question largement ouverte en raison de l’existence d’un problème de biais hypothètique –
qui désigne la différence généralement observée entre les valeurs monétaires déclarées dans un
contexte hypothètique et les engagements financiers effectifs des individus. Ce biais apparaît
à la fois parce que les individus sur-estiment leur vraie valeur dans un contexte hypothètique
et parce qu’ils sous-estiment leur véritable engagement financier dans un contexte réel. Cet
article cherche à évaluer dans quelle mesure une procédure de serment solennel peut permettre
d’améliorer les mécanismes de révélation des préférences au regard de ces deux dimensions.
En application des résultats de la théorie de l’engagement issue de la psychologie sociale, les
participants aux expériences ont la possibilité de s’engager sur l’honneur à donner des réponses
sincères avant de participer à une enchère au second prix. Les résultats issus de traitements
en valeur induite suggèrent que les enchères précédées d’un serment dominent toutes les autres
conditions expérimentales (incitations montaires, hypothètique et serment avec incitations). Un
second traitement applique ce même mécanisme à la révélation des préférences à l’égard de la
protection des dauphins. La signature d’un serment solennel conduit les participants à prendre
en compte à la fois leur contrainte budgétaire (ce qui discipline le comportement de révélation
dans le haut de la distribution) et leur contrainte de participation (ce qui les conduit à déclarer
des valeurs positives plutôt que des valeurs nulles destinées à se soustraire à l’enchère). Ces
résultats sont robustes à la familiarité des participants à l’égard du mécanisme d’enchère ainsi
qu’à l’usage d’un vocabulaire qui met en évidence les conséquences du serment.
Mots-clés: Serment; Engagement ; Enchère à la Vickrey ; Biais hypothétique ;
Valeurs induites ; Valeurs réelles.
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What gives an oath the degree of efficacy it possesses, is,
that in most points, and with most men, a declaration upon
oath includes a declaration upon honor: the laws of honor
enjoining as to those points the observance of an oath. The
deference shown is paid in appearance to the religious cer-
emony: but in reality it is paid, even by the most pious
religionists, much more to the moral engagement than to
the religious.
Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of judicial evidence (1827).
1 Introduction
Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remains a challenge due to hypothetical bias – the
so-called gap between hypothetical monetary values and real economic commitment. Accumulating
experimental evidence from lab and field reveals the average person tends to overstate real economic
commitments by a substantial amount.1 These results reinforce the long-standing explanation that
the bias arises because the budget constraint is not binding in hypothetical valuation exercises (see
Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze, 1986; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Harrison and Rutström,
2008, for a review). Other observers, however, have argued the opposite – real bids are “too low”
as bidders shave bids downward, even to zero if they use the bid to exit the auction. Recall
mechanism design requires a person to be no worse off by participating in the mechanism than
otherwise, i.e., the participation constraint (see for instance Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Most
lab or field experiments, however, do not provide people with a controlled “opt-out” mechanism to
exit the auction. Pressing people to state a bid in an auction they do not want to be in could serve
to pressure the person, thereby violating his or her participation constraint.2 Hypothetical bids
without binding budget constraints, or real economic commitments without binding participation
constraints, both suggest we need to find another institution to commit the bidder to behaving
sincerely when stating their preferences.
Faced with such revelation problems, real-world courts ask witnesses to take an oath “to tell the
truth and nothing but the truth”. Using the theory of commitment from social psychology (Kiesler,
1971; Joule and Beauvois, 1998), we herein examine whether this traditional real-world institution
1The concern over hypothetical bias comes from the large literature on valuation through stated preference surveys
– see, among others, Cherry, Frykblom, Shogren, List, and Sullivan (2004); Smith (1994); Harrison (2006) for a
summary. Based on eighty-three studies, Murphy, Allen, Stevens, and Weatherhead (2005) for instance found the
ratio of hypothetical-real bids ranged from near unity to twenty-five for different deliverable goods like irradiated
pork, watercolor paintings, and maps.
2Bidders can opt out of the experiment by bidding zero, as a result of this violation (Smith, 1994; Cherry,
Frykblom, Shogren, List, and Sullivan, 2004, see for example). An over-abundance of zero bids then emerge as people
use their low bid to opt out of what they consider to be an unacceptable auction environment. For example, in a
field experiment auctioning off a valuable Cal Ripken Jr. baseball card, List and Shogren (1998) observed more than
half the bidders bidding zero for the card immediately after submitting a positive hypothetical bid.
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can induce subjects to reveal their preferences sincerely. We use a solemn oath as a truth-telling-
commitment device, asking our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to
participating in an incentive compatible second-price auction. Bidders are free to sign the oath
or not, and participation and earnings are not conditional on signing the oath. Our experimental
evidence comes from two experiments, designed jointly: an induced value (IV) second-price auction
and a homegrown value (HG) second-price auction. The design and rules implemented in both are as
identical as possible. This allows us to build on the results from the controlled IV auction to interpret
bidding behavior for a non-market good for which we do not know the homegrown demand curve.
For each experiment, we run three main treatments: the baseline disconnects bidding decisions
and subjects’ payoffs from the experiment (the traditional hypothetical context) ; the real setting
reintroduces monetary incentives ; and the oath treatment gives the subjects the option of signing
an oath to tell the truth before participating in the baseline.
For induced values, our results show oath improved demand revelation – people bid more sin-
cerely after taking an oath without any monetary incentives. Adding monetary payments to the
oath, however, reduced sincere bidding, supporting the idea that external incentives crowd out the
intrinsic motivation enhanced by commitment (see Bowles, 2008). For homegrown values, the oath
elicited preferences that seemed to reduce violations both in the budget constraint (only 18.9% over-
bidding compared to 47.7% in the hypothetical-only auction) and in the participation constraint
(only 1.1% zero bids compared to 26.7% in the real-only auction). Overall, our findings suggest the
oath has potential to create the commitment needed to better link intentions and actions in demand
revelation.
2 Background: Oaths, commitment and preference elicitation
Oaths are found in many cultures and societies. Sylving (1959) traced the familiar oath of the
present-day courtroom back to pre-religious, pre-animistic cultures. Sylving argues that in the pre-
animistic stage the oath, a primitive self-curse, was a meaningful expression of man’s belief in his
own magic power. Seton (1930) reports that in the Igala Tribe in Nigeria oaths were sworn to the
Attah Ebbo, the father of magic, to ensure the fidelity of its members. The oath has taken on a
more religious context in modern monotheist societies in which the oath-taker invokes a God as
a witness to his or her sincerity (and offers him or herself as subject to divine vengeance in the
case of perjury). In some modern Western countries, however, a person who refuses to swear on
the grounds that he does not believe in an almighty omniscient God can swear upon his honor and
conscience. The ancient Greek application of the oath, later adopted by Roman exponents of Greek
thought, was based on moral, humanistic considerations (although it was believed in Greece and
Rome that Zeus or Jupiter strikes perjurers with lightning). Taking an oath was the mark of proud,
self-confident and free human beings: “[...] an oath is a kind of test to prove that men are free-born”
(Plutarch, 40-120 AD, Roman Question ]44).
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This view has been disputed by philosophers such as Emmanuel Kant for whom the oath serves
to challenge the view that truthfulness is an absolute duty (Sylving, 1959), and no oath is needed
to incite people to tell the truth. Johann Gottlieb Fichte claims that one cannot force anybody to
swear an oath because a person “who would have no scruple to affirm publicly a falsehood [...] will
confirm this by an oath” (Fichte, 1797, p.139, translated by the authors). Invoking a God who will
punish the perjurer would only be an act of superstition, which goes against the moral nature of
religion according to Fichte. Fichte claims that an oath can only be seen as a solemn assurance
“with the only aim to detain from all carelessness and to bring people to concentrate and to reflect
on the importance of such assurance” (p.138) and asserts that only people who voluntarily agree to
depend on an oath from another party must believe that he or she tells the truth: “volenti non fit
injuria” (p.139). For us, this means that if we ask people to take an oath to tell the truth, we must
then believe that they do so and cannot grumble if they don’t. Said differently, if we ask people to
truthfully reveal their preferences, we voluntarily accept the risk that they may be lying to us.
2.1 The oath as a commitment device
What the social psychology theory of commitment tells us is that the risk of lying is greatly di-
minished in an oath-taking context. This is because taking an oath can be understood as a strong
commitment (see Joule and Beauvois, 1998, for an extended review).3 Kiesler and Sakumura (1966)
define commitment as a “binding of the individual to behavioral acts” (p.349). This means that, in
a given course of action, one’s past actions influence actions to come. Foot-in-the-door experiments
are typical methods used in social psychology to produce commitment from people. This procedure
first asks subjects to perform an initial request purposefully designed so nearly everyone will comply
with the task. Subjects are then asked for a second request which is thematically in line with the
initial one. A classic example is the panhandler who first asks a passer-by if he knows what time
it is, and then asks him if he has any spare change. The standard result is that people are more
likely to agree to perform the second request if they have already agreed to perform the initial one
(see Burger, 1999, for a review). In their seminal experiment on foot-in-the-door devices, Freedman
and Fraser (1966a) telephoned housewives in Palo Alto, California. They asked them if they would
be willing to answer a few questions about the kind of soaps they use. Two or three days later, the
subjects were asked if they would accept a visit from five or six men at their house for two hours or
so, to classify the household products they use. In this foot-in-the-door situation, 52.8% agreed the
second request. In the control group, where only the second request was made, only 22.2% agreed
to it.
Further evidence from commitment-experiments in social psychology has shown that subjects
comply with certain actions much more often when they have freely chosen to commit themselves
3The idea of commitment has been used in the context of “commitment device” in economics at least since
Schelling (1960) and Elster (1977). Their individual commitment devices work to solve problems of self-control and
intertemporal inconsistencies (see Brocas, Carrillo, and Dewatripont, 2003, for a review). This literature, however,
has not put forward any direct link with the social psychological theory of commitment.
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to doing them through a prior engagement or promise. In Kulik and Carlino (1987), for instance,
parents of a child suffering from an inner ear infection (otitis media) were asked to express a verbal
promise to give their child all prescribed antibiotic medication. Parents who were committed through
this verbal promise showed significantly higher compliance than a control group of parents who had
not been asked to promise. Interestingly, recent findings from experiments in economics support
this evidence. In studies focusing on pre-play communication in games, people are observed to
make promises to other players about what they are going to do later in the game. Moreover, those
people who made promises in the communication phase are found to be likely to keep them when
playing in both a hold-up game (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004) and in trust games (Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006).
The magnitude of the behavioral effects of committing oneself to a particular task (for example
by making a promise or signing an undertaking) depends on the degree of commitment, commitment
being “a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous one” (see Kiesler, 1971, p.30). Additional
findings in social psychology have shown that commitment holds with force when it has been written
down and signed or publicly announced (Pallack, Cook, and Sullivan, 1980; Katzev and Wang,
1994). For instance, Wang and Katsev (1990) asked people to sign an undertaking to recycle paper
by throwing used paper in a specific bin. This small addition to the design increased the average
weight of recycled paper by more than one hundred percent. Similar results were obtained through
asking people to sign an undertaking to replace ordinary lamp bulbs at home by low consumption
ones (Joule, Girandola, and Bernard, 2007) or to take a shower instead of a bath for a certain period
of time (Joule, Bernard, and Halimi-Falkowicz, 2007). To sum up, commitment theory states that
commitment is stronger if it has been made freely, was publicly expressed and/or has consequences
for the subject ; as opposed to being obtained under pressure, made anonymously and/or being
without consequences.
>From that point of view, an oath that is publicly expressed, taken freely and signed, appears an
extreme and more accentuated commitment device than a verbal promise or a written undertaking.
An oath should induce people to be consistent with their initial commitment in subsequent decisions.
We apply this to elicitation methods based on stated preference, by having people swear to tell the
truth.4
4 As far as we know, the only explicit occurrence of the oath in the literature in economics is Braham and
Bolle (2006). In a game theoretical framework, the authors consider institutional signals, such as an oath, as signal
simpliciters, that is, as an unmistakable cue that serves to communicate information which can incite action or
influence the behavior of others. As noted by Schlesinger (2008), however, the solemn oath is a serious promise made
with the full intention of being kept. Beyond its informational content, an oath is above all a personal commitment.
In that sense, the oath focuses a person’s attention on the task at hand just like the cheap talk procedure used in some
valuation exercises (e.g., see Cummings and Taylor, 1999). Unlike cheap talk scripts, though, our oath procedure
does not provide information on how other people behave, but rather asks each person to comply with their signed
statement – which is to tell the truth. Unlike the oath, moreover, cheap talk is only informative and does not rely
on any kind of commitment from subjects.
6Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.43
2.2 Open questions in “real auction” bidding behavior
Preference elicitation methods are mechanisms to reveal individual preferences in contexts where the
market cannot reveal them. While auctions with real economic commitments should provide – in
theory – the incentive needed for sincerely bidding in a demand-revealing auction, evidence suggests
this is not always the case. In induced value settings, for instance, experimental evidence suggests
bidders off the margin of the market clearing price are less likely to bid sincerely in demand-revealing
auctions (see e.g., Kagel, 1995). Here off-the-margin bidders tend to over-bid if they perceive their
induced value is far removed from the potential market clearing price in a real auction (see for
example, Shogren, Margolis, Koo, and List, 2001). Data suggests low-value bidders tend to bid a
positive but excessive amount compared to the induced value in the second-price auction (see for
example, Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler, 2001).
In contrast, within homegrown value settings, evidence suggests a different pattern of behavior
– a set of bidders bid “zero”, which suggests they are under-stating their preference in a real eco-
nomic commitment context. These bidders seem to be using their low bid to opt out of what they
may consider to be an unacceptable auction environment. This arises because most real bidding
experimental designs do not provide people with an opt-out mechanism to exit the market. Pressing
people to state a bid in an auction they do not want to be in could serve to pressure them, thereby
violating their participation constraint.
Social psychology theory also helps explain some underbidding in real auction experiments. The
psychological theory of reactance supports this point – people will find some way to opt out of a
situation when pressured in an unappreciated or unacknowledged way (Brehm, 1966). The theory
works in three steps. First, a person perceives an unreasonable or unfair restriction on his or her
action; he fails to see why it is being applied, or judges that the context is too harsh, or feels that the
restriction is unfairly limited to a few people. Second, the restriction induces an intense motivational
state, called reactance. Reactance arises because people perceive themselves as wronged or misled
and they want out of the situation. Third, the person acts to remove reactance. People with
reactance try to get the unreasonable or unfair restriction removed, or else they try to subvert the
restriction.5
As a result of reactance, a large number of zero bids can be observed within real bidding behavior
in lab and field experiments. Consider the experimental design in List and Shogren (1998), for
example. Today one of the authors is less convinced of the evidence supporting the case that real
bidding behavior in lab or field experiments is the best benchmark of “true homegrown values”.
List and Shogren observed that 50 to 55 percent of all bids dropped to zero in the real auction
(from a positive amount in the hypothetical auction), which translated into over one-third of the
valuation gap between real and hypothetical bidding. At the time, hypothetical bidding was seen
5Reactance operates as a special form of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) but reactance has one distinctive
feature: people experience reactance when someone else restricts them in an unreasonable or unfair way while
dissonance is experienced when people act inconsistently, that is dissonance is induced by the people themselves.
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Table 1: Experimental design
Experimental design
Experiment Commitment Quiz Vickrey with IV Vickrey with HG
IV ×
IV + Oath × ×
HG × ×
HG + Oath × × ×
HG + Traning × × ×
HG + Training + Oath × × × ×
HG + Consequential Oath × × ×
Main features of each core part
Commitment Quizz Vickrey with IV Vickrey with HG
Number of repetitions 1 10 questions 9 5
Group sizes 1 1 9 9
Payments - Number of Sum of auction’s Winner’s earnings
true answers earnings decreased by 2nd price
Experimental Treatments – Take-Home earnings from the experiment
Baseline All auctions are non-binding
Monetary incentives The last auction of the experiment is binding
Show-up fee In all experiments, set equal to 10 e
as the culprit. Reflecting back, the experimental design most likely generated the large number of
zero real bids observed. First, the monitors asked people to state a hypothetical bid for a baseball
card; and then immediately asked each person for a bid with actual monetary consequences. A
person first bid hypothetically and then was told the auction was now “for real”. Given that this
experiment was run in the field at a sports card show, many people could have seen this design as
a “bait and switch” or “entrapment”, and re-acted to this by opting out with a zero bid. People can
use the zero bid option to exit a contrived market within which they are otherwise trapped. Many
otherwise positive value bidders seemed to use the zero bid as a sure-fire way to exit the auction
without playing – no pay, no play.6 The aim of the oath is to induce these potential zero bidders
to think about what positive value they actually put on the auction, and not to use their bid in
protest or to opt out.
6The degree to which zero-bid reactance is at stake in experiments that use discrete choice or referendum mech-
anisms is unclear given the 0-1 nature of the bidding (Cummings and Taylor, 1999, see), i.e., when is a “no” a “no
to the price,” and when is it a “no to the participation itself”? One could expect some reactant zero answers if
people felt pressure to participate and they had no other opt-out option in these experiments than to say “no”. This
reactance effect is similar to the idea of “protest bids” that emerged early on in the non-market valuation literature
(see Cummings et al. 1986). Here a zero bid in a contingent valuation survey could be a “protest” against the survey
exercise rather than a statement of zero value for the nonmarket good in question
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2.3 Overview of the experimental design
In the light of all the above, the open question this paper addresses is whether an oath can induce
more sincere bidding behavior, thanks to commitment, thereby improving the power of demand
revelation and the accuracy of stated preference methods. Herein, we test whether a person taking
an oath bids more sincerely in an incentive-compatible auction, both in induced and homegrown
value auctions. The test is based on the set of experiments described in Table 1. Throughout the
paper, we hold constant the demand revelation mechanism – the classic second price Vickrey auction.
We start by testing the oath both with and without monetary incentives in an IV auction. These
different treatments allow us to calibrate observed bidding behavior against theory and against each
treatment. We then examine how the oath affects preference elicitation of HG values to protect
dolphins compared to hypothetical and real bidding. Finally, we design two robustness treatments
to test the reliability or fragility of our evidence: the first relies on the IV auction design to train
subjects with the mechanism before entering the dolphin adoption auctions; the second implements
an alternative procedure for the oath.
3 Testbed treatments: The oath in an induced value auction
The induced-value setting provides the highest level of control on preferences. We use this as a
benchmark to assess how the oath affects preference elicitation.
3.1 Design of the IV-Experiment
Our first experiment implements a four-treatment design of an IV auction: (i) baseline hypothetical
bidding, without oath or monetary incentives; (ii) baseline coupled with an oath ; (iii) bidding with
binding monetary incentives and (iv) an oath coupled with monetary incentives.
IV-Baseline. We use a Vickrey second price auction, in which the highest bidder pays the second-
highest bid. In relying on an auction rather than, for instance, a provision point mechanism, we
depart from some previous studies aimed at investigating hypothetical bias in preference revelation
(Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Brown, Ajzen, and Hrubes, 2003). The rationale for this choice is four-
fold. First, Vickrey auctions are weakly demand-revealing: in theory, each bidder’s weakly dominant
strategy is to bid her or his induced value (Vickrey, 1961). Second, they are straightforward to
explain. Third, market price is endogenous. Fourth, bidders announce their value for the good in
a continuous manner and this allows for much more precision in the statistical analysis than with
provision point mechanisms.
Each auction has 9 bidders, each endowed with a single induced value – i.e., the price at which the
bidder can sell the good to the monitor after the auction. The induced demand curve is identical in
all auctions and is defined by: {84; 76; 71; 68; 65; 63; 53; 38; 24}. All monetary values are expressed in
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ecu (Experimental Currency Unit). The auction is repeated over 9 rounds, implementing all possible
permutations among individual private values. Each bidder experiences each private value once,
and the entire demand curve is induced in every period. Hypothetical profits equal the difference
between the induced value and the price the winning bidder pays for the good (the second highest
bid). If a bidder does not purchase the good, her profit is zero for that round. Only the winner sees
the two highest bids at the end of the round.
Although the repetition is deterministic, we avoid end-game effect by providing the subjects with
no information on that point – except for the repetition itself. Each bidder knows nothing about
the other bidders’ induced value or the induced demand curve. A bidding period ends when each
bidder has chosen a bid between 0 and 100. After each round, bidders are informed privately about
whether they won and, in this case only, the market clearing price and the hypothetical earnings for
that period. Lastly, everybody is privately informed about whether a new auction period is about
to start. Each bidder is paid a flat 10e show-up fee for participating in the experiment.
IV-Monetary-incentives. This treatment makes bidding behavior binding – auction winners
earn their take-home pay based on the difference in their induced value and the market-clearing
price for each round. The common knowledge exchange rate is 3ecu for 1AC. The monetary values
in ecu accumulated across all auction periods are added to a 10e show-up fee – in the event of
negative total earnings, the show up fee could decrease to as low as 5e .7 The monetary incentives
are common knowledge, since we state explicitly that payments depend upon decisions made in each
period at the beginning of the written instructions, and repeat this at the end.
IV-Oath. This treatment is identical to the baseline except each subject is asked to sign an
explicit oath before entering the lab. The oath is implemented as follows: each subject enters alone
and is directed to a monitor at the front of the laboratory. The monitor then offers each subject a
form to sign entitled “solemn oath”.8 An English translation of the original oath form in French is
provided in Figure 1. The Paris School of Economics logo on the top of the form and the address
at the bottom indicate that it is an official paper; the topic designation and the research number
were added so to ensure the credibility. The monitor explicitly points out to the subject before
he or she reads the form that he or she is free to sign the oath or not, and that participation and
earnings are not conditional on signing the oath (subjects are, however, not informed about the
topic of the experiment when asked to take the oath). The subject reads this form, which asks
whether he or she agrees “to swear upon my honour that, during the whole experiment, I will tell
the truth and always provide honest answers” (emphasized in the original form). We chose
the wording “solemn oath” and “upon honour” given the secularism of French modern society, in
7This lower results arises from participants recruitment conditions: we contractually commit ourselves to minimum
earnings of 5AC.
8The “Oath” is written on the form and read by the subject, but never said aloud.
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Figure 1: Oath form used in the experiments
SOLEMN OATH
Topic: “ATNoReC”; Research number 4523B
I undersigned ....................................... swear upon my honour that, during
the whole experiment, I will:
Tell the truth and always provide honest answers.
Paris, ................ Signature...................
Paris School of Economics, 48 Boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris - France.
which law and political parties cannot be based on any religion.9 The oath procedure could make
a specific reference to the Bible, for example, if the experiments were run in the US. Regardless of
whether the subject signs the oath, he or she is thanked and invited to enter the lab. The exact
wording used by the monitors to offer the oath to respondents was scripted to standardize the
phrasing of the oath. One monitor stayed in the lab until all subjects had been presented with the
oath, to avoid communication prior to the experiment. Subjects waiting their turn could neither
see nor hear what was happening at the oath-desk.
9The French Constitution is itself based on such an oath: the Tennis Court Oath (in French, serment du Jeu de
Paume) which was an oath signed by the members of France’s Third Estate to continue to meet until a constitution
had been written, despite royal prohibition.
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IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives. This treatment combines the IV-Oath procedures with the
binding auction bidding in the IV-Monetary-incentives treatment.
3.2 Experimental procedures
Four experimental sessions – one per treatment – were conducted at University Paris I. Each session
involved 18 subjects, providing two independent observations on a 9-times repeated Vickrey auction.
The experiment was computerized using a software program developed under Regate (Zeiliger,
2000) and participants were recruited based on Orsee (Greiner, 2004).
On arrival, a monitor welcomes the participants and distributes an individual consent form.
Unlike the oath form, the consent form is mandatory and publicly distributed. It also indicates that
the subject will earn at least 5e in the experiment. Participants hand in the form to the monitor
before entering the lab. In the IV-Oath treatment, the consent form is picked up at the private desk,
before the oath presentation. A computer is then randomly assigned to each subject and a monitor
distributes and reads aloud the instructions, based on Cherry, Frykblom, Shogren, List, and Sullivan
(2004)’.10 To improve understanding of the game, a non-numerical example is developed covering
all the instructions. However, the instructions do not indicate that bidding one’s induced value is
the dominant strategy. Participants are also asked to answer a short questionnaire highlighting the
most salient features of the game. Once the questionnaire is orally corrected the experiment begins.
In each session, subjects begin by answering a short socio-demographic survey about individual
characteristics. The auction rounds then start. After 9 rounds, the monitor pays each subject
privately in cash – a fee of 10AC in the baseline and oath treatments and a sum computed from
this same fee and the amount of ecu accumulated (or lost) in the monetary incentive treatments.
Overall, 72 subjects participated, yielding 162 observations. The experiment lasted around half an
hour and the average take-home earnings was about 10e .
3.3 Results
Table 2 provides raw data on observed behavior by treatment and round. Contrary to most studies
run in North America (see Murphy, Allen, Stevens, and Weatherhead, 2005, for a survey) we do
not observe a bias between the IV-Baseline and IV-Monetary-incentives treatments.11 The average
demand revelation is even slightly better when monetary incentives are dropped, falling from 106%
to 104%. This feature has been replicated in valuation experiments in France (see e.g., Ehmke,
Lusk, and List, 2007).
But this does not imply that our bidders perfectly revealed their true value for the good. In fact,
past experimental evidence has shown that the second-price auction with monetary incentives only
10An English translation of the original instructions in French is available from the authors upon request.
11An unconditional test of equality between average bids under the two conditions leads to a t statistic equal to
0.4610, the p-value of which (0.6451, two-sided) unambiguously supports the claim.
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Table 2: Aggregate bidding behavior by group and round
Agreg. Round
Demand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
IV-Baseline
1084 938 992 1140 1103 1221 1153 1179 1142 1266 10134
86.5 91.5 105.2 101.8 112.6 106.4 108.8 105.4 116.8 103.9
IV-Monetary 1084 949 1081 1245 1149 1062 1254 1290 1168 1130 10328
-incentives 87.5 99.7 114.8 105.9 98.0 115.7 119.0 107.7 104.2 105.9
IV-Oath
1084 977 1121 1117 1093 1214 1172 1155 1093 1186 10128
90.1 103.4 103.0 100.8 112.0 108.1 106.5 100.8 109.4 103.8
IV-Oath+Monetary 1084 991 1072 1134 1097 1137 1189 1236 1258 1242 10356
-incentives 91.4 98.9 104.6 101.2 104.9 109.7 114.0 116.0 114.6 106.2
Note. The second column reports the aggregate induced demand, i.e., the sum of the induced values exogenously attributed
to the buyers. For each treatment in row, the upper figure gives the aggregate revealed demand, i.e., the observed bids) in
each round (in column) and summed over rounds (last column). The lower figure gives the ratio of this revealed demand to the
aggregate induced demand, in %.
leads to mixed performance at the individual level – as bidders overbid or underbid relative to their
induced value (see Kagel, 1995). This is particularly salient for off-the-margin bidders, i.e., those
whose the private value for the good is at the lower end of the distribution (Parkhurst, Shogren,
and Dickinson, 2004).
In line with this, we observe poor revelation of the whole demand curve for both treatments.
Table 3 summarizes the aggregate bidding behavior by treatment and IV. Demand revelation almost
monotonously decreases, from 159% under binding incentives – and 145% in IV-Baseline – for the
lowest induced value, to rather satisfactory revelation (105% under monetary incentives and 101%
in the baseline) for the highest induced value. If all subjects maximized their personal payoff, each
bid should equal the induced value. In our setting, 5.5% of bids are perfectly demand-revealing
in the IV-Baseline treatment; 70.3% of bids were within a ±10 percent interval centered on the
induced value. Insincere bidders both inflated and shaved bids in near-equal percentages: 46.3%
and 48.1%.
Result 1 In an induced value second price auction, bidding behavior both with and without monetary
incentives differs from perfect demand revelation.
Support. We test the assumption of perfect revealing bids by specifying the true underlying bidding
function as linear in induced value: b∗it = βνit+α+φt+αi+it, where bit denotes subject i’s ecu bid
in trial t; νit denotes subject i’s induced value in trial t; φt are fixed-round effects and the αi’s are
zero mean subject-specific random variables with common variance σ2α. This last term accounts for
individual heterogeneity in bidding behavior. The bids we observe, bit, are censored at 0 and 100 due
to the design of the experimental auction. We estimate the true underlying parameters by fitting
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Table 3: Aggregate bidding behavior by group and Induced Value
IV 24 38 53 63 65 68 71 76 84
AD 432 684 954 1134 1170 1224 1278 1368 1512
IV-Baseline
RAD 626 808 1050 1193 1201 1192 1242 1290 1532
RAD/AD 144.9 118.1 110.1 105.2 102.6 97.4 97.2 94.3 101.3
IV-Monetary-
incentives
RAD 687 735 1078 1045 1318 1259 1281 1334 1591
RAD/AD 159.0 107.5 113.0 92.2 112.6 102.9 100.2 97.5 105.2
IV-Oath
RAD 475 757 1046 1129 1261 1249 1331 1345 1535
RAD/AD 109.9 110.7 109.6 99.6 107.8 102.0 104.1 98.3 101.5
IV-Oath+Monetary RAD 710 807 1045 1185 1218 1256 1234 1381 1520
-incentives RAD/AD 164.4 118.0 109.5 104.5 104.1 102.6 96.6 101.0 100.5
Note. The first row reports the induced values (IV) attributed to buyers. The second row reports the corresponding aggregate
demand (AD) in each treatment, i.e., induced values × number of subjects. For each treatment (four remaining rows), the
upper part of the row displays the revealed aggregate demand (RAD, i.e., the observed bids posted by buyers the induced value
of whom are reported in column). The lower part reports the ratio of this revealed demand to the aggregate induced demand,
in %.
the latent variable model: bit = min[max(b∗it, 0), 100]. Assuming normality of the idiosyncratic error
term, this defines a panel Tobit model censored at both 0 and 100.
The model is implemented by assuming that the distribution of heterogeneity in the population,
αi, is normal and uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error. Econometric results are given in Table 4.
Based on the estimated parameters of the bidding function, we can test for perfect revealing bids for
each treatment by considering H0 : {β = 1, α = 0, φt = 0 ∀t} (see, for instance, Shogren, Margolis,
Koo, and List, 2001). Results from Wald tests for the first two treatments are:
IV-Baseline : W=38.66 p =0.0000 H0 Rejected
IV-Monetary : W=23.36 p =0.0095 H0 Rejected
We reject the perfect revealing bids for both treatments.
This leaves the door open for improvement, and we now look at whether there is mileage in
asking bidders if they would be willing to swear to tell the truth and to give honest answers prior
to participating in the auction without monetary incentives. We found that many subjects were
happy to take the oath, and most of them decided very quickly to do so. Some even pointed out
that responding truthfully during the experiment was natural and entirely normal– however, as we
have seen above, telling the truth is not obvious at all in IV-baseline and IV-Monetary treatments.
We had an acceptance rate of 94.5% as only one subject out of eighteen refused to take the oath.
Self-selection is not an issue.12
The third line of Table 3 describes bidding behavior in the IV-Oath treatment. Aggregate
bidding behavior exhibits satisfactory revelation over the whole demand curve. In particular, we
do not observe over-bidding for the lowest induced value: the ratio of revealed aggregate demand
12Five percent refusal rate is standard for commitment experiments (Joule and Beauvois, 1998; Burger, 1999).
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Table 4: IV bidding behavior – Panel Tobit estimations
Variable IV-Monetary-incentives IV-Baseline IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives IV-Oath
n = 162 n = 162 n = 162 n = 162
Parameter estimates
(p-value)
νit .855 .788 .756 .969
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant .480 4.44 8.99 -6.1
(.945) (.394) (.044) (.182)
Round dummies yes yes yes yes
σu 2.40 9.19 4.88 8.72
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
σ 19.55 14.25 12.31 12.64
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Log-likelihood -675.11597 -659.40375 -640.24359 -641.81659
Note. Individual random effects Tobit models. The random effects are assumed normal; round (fixed) effects are controlled for
in the estimation, but omitted in the Table. The endogenous variable is the bid posted. νi denotes the induced private value.
The columns report results from separate regressions on each treatment.
over aggregate demand is 110%. In addition, 16.0% of bids equal the induced value, and 70.4% are
within 10 percent of this value. Insincere bidders tend to inflate rather than shave their bids: 50.7%
of bids were higher than the private value and 33.3% lower.
Result 2 In a hypothetical second price auction, asking a bidder to take an explicit oath pledging
to tell the truth and always provide honest answers leads to sincere bidding behavior.
Support. Based on the Tobit regression provided in Table 4, we apply the Wald test of perfectly
revealing bids to the IV-Oath treatment.
IV-Oath : W=15.55 p =0.1133 H0 Not rejected
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the subjects motivated by the oath bid sincerely. We
used the treatment variable – each subject was asked to take an oath, and not whether or not he or
she agreed to take the oath. Descriptive statistics and econometric tests lead to similar conclusions
when the subject who did not sign the oath is dropped from the analysis.13
Since we focus on the behavioral consequences of the oath, we do not provide here a direct test
of the psychological motives underlying the observed change in bidding behavior when subjects have
signed an oath. Various candidates can be found in the literature. A first possible explanation stems
from the self-attribution interpretation put forward in the theory of commitment: people infer their
13Detailed results are available upon request from the authors.
15Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.43
attitudes from their own behavior (Bem, 1972; Kiesler, Nisbett, and Zanna, 1969).14 In line with
this, people deduce from their first behavior that they are the “kind of person [...] who does this
sort of thing” (Freedman and Fraser, 1966b, p.101), and are subsequently more likely to perform
the second request. Following this line of reasoning, the oath acts as a commitment device in our
experiment because it puts people in a certain mind frame regarding the action that is going to
follow. That is, when they bid in the auction, subjects may consider themselves as being someone
who bids sincerely because they have already signed the oath that commits them to “tell the truth”.
The oath frames how each person thinks about his or her behavior in the task.
Two further interpretations come from the economic literature on pre-play communication in
experimental games, which has shown that promises exchanged freely before the game starts enhance
cooperative behavior. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) consider that communication in general,
and promises in particular, create commitment because people have a preference for consistency.
This implies individuals have a taste for keeping their word. Formally, this preference induces
a cost of lying for those who do not respect their own promises. The authors show in a trust
game that inequality aversion combined with a cost of lying strengthens the credibility of promises.
Following this first line of reasoning, the oath can impose a cost on lying if bidders do not bid their
induced value after having signed the oath. This in turn fosters truth-telling behavior, which in our
case means disciplining off-the-margin bidders for whom the Vickrey second price auction does not
perform well. The second explanation is based on guilt aversion, which happens to a player failing
to meet the payoff expectations attributed to others (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Battigalli and
Dufwenberg, 2007). Avoiding such disappointments to others could then be the reason why people
keep their promises in trust games (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). In our case, this would
mean subjects bid sincerely because they do not want to disappoint the monitor. Vanberg (2008)
presents an experiment that distinguishes between these two explanations, by comparing the effect
of promises in trust games, depending on whether the player is the one who made them or not (some
players are randomly switched after the pre-play communication phase). Results unambiguously
favor the taste-based – which Vanberg also labels “commitment-based” (p.1467) – explanation.
One common feature of the first two explanations is that the oath enhances the intrinsic mo-
tivation of subjects to reveal their true value. In this context, social psychologists have shown
that extrinsic motivation can be counterproductive: when people receive “extrinsic” rewards (often
monetary) for doing an interesting task, their intrinsic motivation for doing the task is affected
adversely. For instance, a person is more likely to stop an ongoing activity of his own accord if he
has received monetary rewards to do it than if he has not received any monetary rewards (see Deci,
1975; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999, for a meta-analysis of 28 experimental results). This finding
14The self-attribution argument is also central to self-signaling models in economics. In self-signaling models, agents
derive utility from the outcome of actions, outcome utility, but also derive diagnostic utility from the information
that the action provides on some underlying trait or disposition in themselves (see for instance Bodner and Prelec,
2001). However, agents in self-signaling models are usually forward-looking whereas in commitment theory the focus
is essentially backward-looking: people infer from past behavior beliefs and attitudes towards actions which are about
to come.
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is also common in foot-in-the-door experiments (Burger, 1999). For instance, Zuckerman, Lazzaro,
and Waldgeir (1979) observed that housewives who were asked to fill-in a five-minute questionnaire
and were paid for the task were less willing to agree to fill in a thirty-minute follow-up questionnaire
three days later, compared to those who were not paid. In addition, these housewives were even
less likely to fill in any questionnaire of any length compared to the other housewives. This led
us to close our 2 × 2 design in such a way as to assess whether incentives can increase oath-based
commitment, by including a fourth treatment which combines the two revelation tools.
Result 3 Combining the oath with monetary incentives leads to less sincere bidding compared to
bidding with oath-only, monetary-only, and the baseline treatments.
Support. Again based on the Tobit regression model, perfect revelation is strongly rejected for the
IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives treatment:
IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives : W=50.86 p =0.0000 H0 Rejected
This treatment leads to a flatter line compared with other treatments. Averaging the trial-specific
effects φt and individual effects αi leads to the following regression lines:
IV-Baseline : bid = 0.788 x Ind. Value + 16.5
IV-Monetary-incentives : bid = 0.855 x Ind. Value + 13.9
IV-Oath : bid = 0.969 x Ind. Value + 3.7
IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives : bid = 0.756 x Ind. Value + 19.1
The IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives condition exhibits the highest discrepancy with the perfect
revealing bid behavior: the slope is lower and the intercept is dramatically larger. Split sample
tests confirm the statistical significance of the result: bidding behavior in the IV-Oath-Monetary-
incentives treatment is significantly different from IV-Baseline (p = 0.05), IV-Monetary-incentives
(p = 0.02) and IV-Oath (p < 0.01).
Crowding-out applies as well to our procedure: IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives induced people to
bid even less sincerely than in other treatments. In line with the self-attribution interpretation,
Deci (1975) and Staw (1976) argue that oversufficient rewards lead subjects to infer that their
actions are motivated by extrinsic reward rather than by their intrinsic interest in doing the task,
leading to overjustification. In our case, a person should have two “good” reasons to bid sincerely in
the IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives. However, the monetary incentives undermine the commitment
induced by signing the oath, because there are now external reasons to bid sincerely in the auction.
Incentives crowd out commitment through the oath. This result supports the literature in economics
suggesting that intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation can be substitutes (see Kreps, 1997;
Frey and Jegen, 2001, for surveys). This also provides additional insights on potential explanations
for the effects of the oath on bidding behavior. Guilt aversion would imply that the oath succeeds
because subjects want to comply with what the experimenter expects from them – a special type
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of Hawthorne effect, recently put forward by Carpenter, Liati, and Vickery, 2006. In line with
this interpretation, however, adding an oath should improve revelation whatever the benchmark.
In particular, this would imply that behavior under IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives would be closer
to perfect revelation than IV-Monetary-incentives. But this is not what we observe. By contrast,
commitment-based explanations can account for this further result, based on the crowding-out of
the intrinsic motivation to tell the truth. In Section 5.2 we rely on an alternative oath procedure
to provide further insights on this point.
To sum up, our experimental results are twofold: (i) the oath procedure significantly improves
the power of the Vickrey mechanism to reveal true values for the good: this device notably manages
to discipline the bidding behavior of off-the margin bidders; (ii) adding monetary incentives weakens
the demand-revealing power of the oath. IV auctions provide persuasive results on the performance
of our elicitation procedures, because preferences are perfectly observed and controlled. The second
set of experiments applies the same experimental design to a setting closer to the field as regards
the good sold in the auction.
4 Application treatments: The oath in Homegrown value auctions
for a nonmarket good
We now consider preference elicitation of homegrown values for a real-world non-market good:
adopting a dolphin through a monetary donation to theWorld Wide Fund (hereafter WWF), a
well-known non-governmental organization devoted to “protecting the future of nature”.15 Subjects’
homegrown values are elicited using the same elicitation mechanism, a second-price auction. The
price for improved parallelism with decisions in the real world is the lack of control over true
preferences in this experimental setting. We focus on three treatments: hypothetical bids, monetary-
incentives bids, and oath-only bidding. We drop the monetary-oath treatment since it was the
worst-performing treatment in the IV testbed experiment.
4.1 Design of the HG-experiment
The good. We focus on preferences for an environmental good, namely the protection of dolphins.
To ensure the credibility of the procedure, we use a particular action offered by the WWF. Among
a wide range of individual actions, the WWF offers the opportunity to “adopt” endangered animal
species. This takes the form of an individual donation to a program aimed at fighting threats like
habitat loss and poaching faced by endangered animals. Depending on the amount of the donation
(among three possible values), donators are sent gifts such as an adoption certificate, a photograph
of the animal, a cuddly stuffed toy dolphin, a gift box, and so on. For the purpose of our experiment,
15The WWF was formerly named the World Wildlife Fund, which remains its official name in the United States
and Canada. Since 2001, the WWF has been named the World Wide Fund in all other countries. More information
about the WWF can be found at http://www.worldwildlife.org/about/.
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this procedure has the attractive feature of ensuring the credibility of the donation, thanks both to
the WWF label and to the documentation associated with donation. We chose the entry-level offer,
i.e., only the adoption certificate and photograph are sent. Since the photograph and the adoption
certificate are essentially symbolic in nature, this reduces the risk of valuations being influenced by
“by-product” goods, such as a cuddly stuffed toy or a gift box.
The adoption procedure is described to the subjects using a French-language, slightly modified
version of the official web page set up by the WWF.16 The page provides a short description of
a dolphin’s life and of the WWF and, more importantly, a detailed presentation of the donation
program and the documentation (gifts) sent should a subject adopt a dolphin. The scroll bar used
to choose a donation amount between 0 and 30 Euros, along with an “OK” button, appears directly
on the page and the subjects see the good description until they confirm their choice.
The actual market price of the donation to the WWF is 25 USD (18.50 Euros when the experi-
ments took place). Since we do not impose any reservation price in the provision rule (as reported
above minimum bid is zero), we subsidize the winning donation to reach the market price when
monetary incentives are binding. The good sold in the experiment is potentially cheaper in the
lab than in the market. Once actual offers are below the market price, the observed values are
independent of field opportunities. This protects our data from the censoring issue raised by, e.g,
Harrison, Harstad, and Rutström (2004). Moreover, subjects are not told anything about this sub-
sidy. Formally speaking, the discrepancy between in-the-lab and market prices is then influential
on observed behavior if and only if subjects are actually aware of the donation procedure and the
market price of the donation. Some items aimed at assessing subjects’ knowledge are included in a
debriefing questionnaire (see Section 4.2 below).
Elicitation mechanism. As in the IV-Experiment, individual valuations for the good are elicited
thanks to a Vickrey (second-price) auction: each bidder privately posts a bid, the highest bid
determining the winner of the auction, i.e., the subject entitled to adopt a dolphin, and the amount
of donation is equal to the second highest bid. We also divide each 18-subject session into smaller
groups of 9 bidders to avoid too much distortion of bidding at the bottom of the distribution of
bids (see Kagel, 1995, and Section 3.3). Two groups in each session are involved in two independent
adoption processes.
Show-up fee property rights. Our focus on donation behavior requires the subjects to enter the
auctions with some positive experimental earnings, which may then be spent on the donation. This
would mean giving subjects a rather large show-up fee for participating in the experiment. It is an
increasing concern in laboratory experiments that behavior can differ according to whether one has
to decide on the allocation of either windfall or earned wealth (sometimes called endowment effect,
see, among others, Rutström, 1998; Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002). In the specific context
16The original page in English is available at https://secure.worldwildlife.org/ogc/ogcAC_speciesDetail.
cfm?gid=8, the page used in the experiment is provided in supplementary material.
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of demand revelation using Vickrey auctions, Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2009) show
that earned money does make a difference to bidding behavior as compared to windfall wealth.
In line with these results, and to be as close as possible to actual stated preferences surveys in
the field, we use an earned-wealth design. This also replicates a common feature of homegrown
valuation experiments focusing on hypothetical bias (e.g., Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Cummings,
Elliott, Harrison, and Murphy, 1997).
Earned wealth is implemented through a preliminary stage during which the subjects are asked
to answer general knowledge questions. Accompanying each question is a list of four possible
answers. The set of questions was taken from the annals of the “Concours de Catégorie B de
la fonction publique” which is a civil service entry test for those who hold at least the French
baccalaureate.17 This is appropriate to discriminate between undergraduate students. Subjects are
explicitly told that one and one only out of the four is true, and that monetary earnings labeled
in ecu (Experimental Currency Unit) are proportional to correct answers. The position of the
correct answer is randomized between questions and the ordering of questions is kept the same for
all subjects in all treatments.18
Experimental treatments. We rely on three main treatments: HG-Baseline, HG-Monetary-
incentives and HG-Oath. The first two treatments only differ as regards the monetary consequences
of the adoption auction. The adoption is hypothetical in the HG-Baseline treatment while the
donations are subtracted from subjects’ earnings in the HG-Monetary-incentives treatment. This
implies that donation is merely declarative in HG-Baseline and no funds are actually transferred
to the WWF – no adoption certificate is sent to the adopter. All other experimental features are
kept the same in these two treatments. The HG-Oath treatment adds an oath procedure to an
HG-Baseline treatment before the experiment starts: each subject is asked to sign a “solemn oath”
before entering the lab. The entire oath procedure is identical to that implemented in the IV-Oath
treatment described in section 3.1. Earnings stemming from the quiz are real in all treatments to
avoid unwarranted wealth differences between our treatments.
4.2 Experimental procedure
On arrival, each subject signs an individual consent form and enters the lab. This form is mandatory
for participation in the experiment. In the HG-Oath treatment only, subjects are then asked to
take a truth-telling oath. A computer is then randomly assigned to each subject and a monitor
distributes and reads aloud the instructions.
The experiment begins by asking the subjects to fill out a computerized questionnaire about
socio-economic characteristics (gender, sex,. . . ). The instructions of each part of the experiment are
17Our source is http://pagesperso-orange.fr/bac-es/qcm/annales_c02_r01.html.
18The data on observed answers are not commented on here; the full list of questions and data are available from
the authors upon request.
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distributed and read aloud just before it starts. Before the game begins, participants are encouraged
to ask clarifying questions, privately answered by the monitor. All experiments start with the quiz
(questions are displayed one after the other along with the four possible answers). Subjects are
provided information on their score only at the end of the quiz along with their corresponding
earnings in ecu. The payment rate is 2 ecu per correct answer and the exchange rate is 3 ecu for
1 AC. With an expectation of ten correct answers out of twenty, the average monetary earnings for
the quiz would be 7 AC (payment is rounded up to the next 50 cents), which makes 17 AC in total
added to the 10 AC show-up fee.
The last part of the experiment in all three treatments is the adoption auction. The instructions
first detail the WWF, the adoption procedure, and how the collected funds will be used. The
auction is then described using the same instructions as in the IV experiment (same non-numerical
example and same questionnaire to check subjects’ understanding at the end of the instructions).
The only difference is the good and its description. Subjects are grouped into two 9-bidder auctions.
The wording of the instructions is slightly modified between the HG-Monetary-incentives and HG-
Baseline treatments. We follow Cummings and Taylor (1999) in replacing the affirmative language
used in real auctions (“you will participate in the adoption procedure”, “you will adopt a dolphin”,
“we commit ourselves to sending your donation to the WWF”) with a hypothetical language in the
hypothetical auctions: “we want you to suppose you were to participate in the adoption procedure”,
“you would adopt a dolphin”, “we would commit ourselves to sending your donation to the WWF”
(italics added).
At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to answer a computerized debriefing question-
naire. The aim of the questions is to assess the level of knowledge and the level of agreement of the
subjects as regards the WWF and its actions, their knowledge of the WWF adoption procedure,
their degree of familiarity with the auction mechanism through online auction websites and whether
they have participated in other experiments or not. Finally, the monitor pays each subject privately
in cash.
4.3 Results
Since subjects enter the lab with their own unobserved preferences, preference revelation can no
longer be deduced by contrasting bidding behavior with true preferences. We rely on bidding
behavior only. In Figure 2, we present the empirical distribution functions (EDF) of bids in HG-
Baseline and HG-Monetary-incentives treatments.
Bids in HG-Baseline dominate bids elicited in HG-Monetary-incentives: the EDF of HG-Baseline
bids is first order stochastically dominated by the EDF of bids elicited with HG-Monetary-incentives.
This means that data exhibit a hypothetical-real gap for low bids as well as for high bids. A closer
look at the data is provided in Table 5, where we compute average and median bids as well as the
number of violations of the two constraints underlying truth-revelation: the number of zero bids,
which includes participation constraint violations through opting-out behavior ; and the number
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Figure 2: Empirical Distribution Functions of bids in real and hypothetical treatments
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Note. Empirical distribution function of bids, pooling all five rounds of the HG experiment: each point along the curve gives
the proportion of observed bids that are lower than the one in abscissa.
of bids above experimental earnings. Recall over-bidding means that the subject would pay out of
hi/her pocket to adopt the dolphin, hypothetically in HG-Baseline and for real in HG-Monetary-
incentive. This gives us a proxy to measure violations of the budget constraint. The Table highlights
a substantial difference in the elicited preferences according to whether incentives are binding or
not: mean and median bids in baseline are AC17.43 and AC19.5 as compared to AC2.98 and AC1 in
monetary-only. This leads to an average hypothetical-real ratio of 584.9%. This means that bids in
HG-Monetary-incentives are on average six times lower than in HG-Baseline.
Consider the low end of bids first. No bidders bid zero values in the hypothetical treatment;
but we observe nearly 27% of bidders bidding zero in the monetary-only treatment. Our level of
zero bids is about half that observed in List and Shogren (1998). The key difference here is that we
used a between-sampling design, while they used a within-sample design in which a hypothetical
bid was followed immediately by the real bid. Reactance theory would predict more recoil within
the within-sample design. Now consider the high end of the distribution. No subject bid so high
that he or she took the chance of paying out of his/her pocket to adopt a dolphin in the monetary
incentives. In contrast, almost half the bid are outside the budget constraint in the HG-baseline
treatment. Together, these two differences produce a significant gap between preferences elicited
with or without monetary incentives. As a result, two distinct variations in behavior drive the result:
the opting-out of the auction through zero bids when incentives are binding,19 and the unreliable
19To further test this explanation, we conducted a companion treatment with monetary incentives identical to that
of HG-Monetary-incentives but with one key change: subjects can choose to either participate or not in the auction
prior to bidding. Interestingly, 3 out of 18 subjects declined to participate in all five auctions. Over all 5 rounds,
41.1% of subjects refused to participate in 1 round or more. We observe only one zero bid in the five rounds (1.1%)
since the subjects choose to participate. This re-enforces our interpretation that zero bids in the real treatment are
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Table 5: Homegrown bidding behavior in real and hypothetical treatments
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 All rounds
Mean bid (AC) 15.36 18.19 17.33 17.38 18.9 17.43
HG-baseline Median bid(AC) 16.25 20.5 19.75 19.75 20.75 19.5
] zero bids 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%)
] bids > gains 7 9 8 9 10 43 (47.7%)
Mean bid (AC) 3.3 2.97 3.17 3.17 2.3 2.98
HG-monetary Median bid (AC) 1.25 1 1.25 1 0.75 1
-incentives ] zero bids 3 5 5 5 6 24 (26.7%)
] bids > gains 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%)
Average hypothetical-real ratio 465.5% 612.5% 546.7% 548.3% 821.7% 584.9%
Note. For each treatment (in row) and by round (in column), the table provides bidding behavior in the homegrown (adopt
a dolphin) experiment: mean and median bid (first two rows for each treatment) ; number of zero bids (third row) and bids
above subject’s experimental earnings (fourth row). The last row of the table gives the ratio between average baseline bids and
average monetary-only bids.
willingness to pay out of ones’ own pocket when incentives are dropped.
Result 4 Hypothetical bias exists in the homegrown second price auction without an oath. We
observe significant differences in bidding behavior with and without monetary incentives. Bidders
frequently violate (47.7%) their experimental earnings budget constraint without monetary incentives;
bidders frequently (26.7%) violate the participation constraint with monetary incentives.
Support. We statistically test the difference in mean bids using a two-sample mean difference test
based on a non-parametric bootstrap procedure that accounts for potential correlation between the
five bids of the same subject and for asymmetry in the empirical distribution of bids. The bootstrap
procedure is based on bootstrapping subjects and their five bids in the sample (999 times), instead
of considering independent bids, i.e., bootstrapping on bids. To account for asymmetry in the
empirical distribution, we computed an equal-tail bootstrap p-value (see Davidson and MacKinnon,
2006). The two-sample bootstrap mean difference test is significant with p < .001. This significant
gap between bids in HG-Baseline and bids in HG-Monetary-incentives is not likely to be explained
by differences in total experimental earnings (earning from the quiz + show-up fee of 5 euros)
between the two treatments: subjects earned on average AC18.9 (s.d. 0.21) in baseline – arising from
an average 13.3 correct answers out of 20 in the earned-money phase – and AC18.6 (s.d. 0.25) with
monetary incentives – 12.88 correct answers in average. A two-sample mean difference test leads to
p = 0.364). Nor can this be explained by differences in respondents characteristics. Unconditional
mean and proportion tests show that there are no significant differences in socio-demographic and
more likely to be reactance to the implied participation constraint in the auction. That is, zero bids suggest a ’no to
the participation itself’ rather than being a ’no to the price’.
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Figure 3: Empirical Distribution Functions of bids in oath treatment
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Note. Empirical distribution function of bids, pooling all five rounds of the HG experiment: each point along the curve gives
the proportion of observed bids that are lower than the one in abscissa.
debriefing questions: gender (p = 0.738), knowing the WWF (p = 0.614), having already adopted
dolphins (only one individual out of 18 had already adopted a dolphin, p = 0.320), level of agreement
with WWF actions (p = 0.508), past experience with the auction mechanism proxied by stated
number of purchases on auction websites (p = 0.400).
The large number of zero bids observed with monetary incentives is explained by: three subjects
out of eighteen who bid only zero bids –16% of total elicited bids ; two subjects who bid zero four
and three times and fifty cents otherwise, and the rest from one bidder with a maximum bid of 50
cents and one with a maximum bid of AC10.
We now turn to the way the oath deals with both violations. In HG-Oath, all subjects but one
took an oath prior to participating in the auction.20 Figure 3 provides the empirical distribution
of bids from those subjects that participated in the oath treatment, along with a recall of the
EDF of bids in the baseline and the monetary incentives treatments. Having subjects sign an oath
before participating in the auction leads to a distribution that first order dominates the baseline.
Quantitative differences can be deduced from Table 6. The mean bidding behavior is AC11.46 after an
oath was signed, as compared to AC17.43 in HG-baseline, i.e., without monetary incentives (Table 5).
Behavior in the oath treatment is also different from what we observe in the monetary incentives
treatment. EDF of bids in HG-Oath first order dominates EDF of bids in HG-monetary-incentives.
The difference is mainly driven by the decrease in the number of zero bids as compared to what
we observe when incentives are binding. Comparing Table 6 to Table 5, the percentage of bids
above subject’s experimental earnings is 18.9% in the oath experiment and 47.7% in the baseline
20Again, the statistical analysis is conducted on the whole sample. Results are similar when excluding the subject
who did not take the oath (detailed results available on request from the authors).
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treatment without monetary incentives. The number of violations is more than twice less when
subjects take an oath.
Result 5 In a second price homegrown values auction with hypothetical decisions, asking a bidder to
take an explicit oath that pledges him or her to tell the truth and always provide honest answers leads
to (i) lower bids than those elicited using incentives and (ii) less violations of the budget constraint
than those observed in the baseline.
Support. The decrease in mean behavior as compared to the behavior we observe in the monetary
treatment is significant at p = 0.026 according to our two-sample one-sided mean difference boot-
strap test. We statistically test the decrease in the number of bids outside the budget constraint
induced by the oath as compared to the behavior in HG-Baseline by a likelihood ratio (LR) propor-
tion test that allows for potential correlation between the five bids of the same subject. The test
is based on the comparison of three multinomial distributions each of which allows for 32 possible
outcomes, and 31 parameters. Each outcome is a vector of dimension five (the five bids of a given
subject –each subject counting as one observation) and a dimension is coded zero if the subject bids
zero or one otherwise, that is 25 = 32 possible outcomes.21 We then compare the estimated loglike-
lihood of the pooled data HG-baseline and HG-Oath together) against the sum of loglikelihoods of
HG-Baseline and HG-Oath considered separately using an LR test. The decrease in bids outside the
budget constraint is significant with p < 0.001 according to our LR test. Again, these results are not
likely to be explained either by differences in experimental earnings (mean experimental earnings
is AC18.88 in HG-Baseline and AC18.13 in HG-Oath, p = 0.275 – corresponding on average to 12.2
correct answers out of 20 in the quiz) or differences in debriefing questions: gender (p = 0.516),
knowing the WWF (p = 0.990), knowledge of the WWF wild animal adoption scheme (only one
subject was aware of it), level of agreement with WWF actions (p = 0.870), past experience with
the auction mechanism (p = 0.210).
We test the overall significance of results 4 and 5 using a random effects panel Tobit model
pooling together data from HG-Baseline, HG-Monetary-incentives and HG-Oath. The left-censoring
limit is 0 and the right-censoring limit 30. These limits are the bounds of the scroll bar used on
the adoption screen when subjects bid their valuation (see section 4.1 and the screen shot of the
adoption page provided in the supplementary material). Dummy variables are introduced to control
for the HG-Monetary-incentives and HG-Oath treatments (HG-Baseline being the referent) as well
as total earnings and individual’s characteristics.22 Results are presented in Table 7: as compared to
behavior in HG-Baseline, monetary incentives drastically decrease revelation: associated parameter
is -16.7 with p < .001. The oath also has a significant impact on bidding behavior as compared to
bidding behavior in HG-Baseline: associated parameter is -7.41 with p = .002. This means that, on
average, the decrease in bids is twice less in HG-Oath than in HG-Monetary-only as compared to
21In our sample, the total number of outcomes is 10 (some particular arrangements of zero bids are not observed).
22In the model, we used only variables with substantial variability. For instance, we excluded “knowledge of WWF
wild animal adoption” because only one subject was aware of it.
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Table 6: Homegrown bidding behavior in the oath treatment
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 All rounds
Mean bid (AC) 9.42 10.72 11.28 11.83 14.02 11.46
HG-oath Median bid (AC) 7 10 10 10 13 10
] zero bids 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1.1%)
] bids > gains 3 2 4 2 6 17 (18.9%)
Average oath-real ratio 285.5% 360.9% 356.2% 373.2% 617.4% 384.9%
Average oath-hypothetical ratio 61.3% 55.9% 65.1% 68.1% 74.1% 65.7%
Note. For each round (in column), the table provides bidding behavior in the homegrown (adopt a dolphin) experiment: mean
and median bid (first two rows for each treatment) ; number of zero bids (third row) and bids above subject’s experimental
earnings (fourth row). The last two rows of the table give the ratios between the average bids after an oath and: first the
average baseline bids, second the average monetary-only bids.
HG-Baseline when accounting for observed heterogeneity of subjects. This difference is significant
with p < .001.
In short, for the IV treatments, the oath paid off – we could not reject the null hypothesis
of sincere bidding in a second price auction under oath. For the homegrown value treatments,
two lessons emerge: (1) hypothetical bias exists and is caused by violations in both budget and
participation constraints, and (2) the oath seems to bind bidders to avoid both violations – people
are less likely to overstate high bids and less likely to understate low bids. The next section describes
two alternative designs which test the robustness of our main results.
5 Robustness: Training and Consequential wording
We widen the context, using two alternative designs to provide evidence on the effects of training
and consequential wording. First, training is common in nearly all experimental auctions (Lusk and
Shogren, 2007), and a substantial difference has been observed depending on whether subjects are
familiar enough with the mechanism. We assess the robustness of our main results to exposure to a
preliminary stage in which our subjects learn how to behave in a second price auction. Second, we
try to gather further evidence on why the oath work, by intensifying the feeling of guilt associated
with violating the oath signed.
5.1 Commitment and training
Our first robustness test involves training via practice rounds with the second price auction. Ideally,
preference elicitation should be more accurate if bidders have no misconceptions about the operations
and procedures of the auction mechanism (see for example Shogren, Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein,
1994; Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Lusk and Shogren, 2007). While straightforward in theory, the second
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Table 7: HG bidding behavior – Panel Tobit estimations
Variable Parameter estimate P-value
Treatment dummies
Constant term 14.67 0.126
Monetary-incentives -16.71 0.000
Oath -7.41 0.002
Earnings (AC) -0.08 0.871
Round dummies yes
Individual’s characteristics
Age -0.11 0.615
Male -2.13 0.295
Participated to other experiments -3.10 0.119
Experience with auctions websites 1.42 0.076
Knows WWF -.243 .937
Agrees with WWF actions 3.23 0.001
Knows WWF’s dolphin adoption programme 1.32 .722
σu (sd.) 6.48 (.69)
σe (sd.) 3.69 (.19)
Log likelihood -747.15
Note. Individual random effects Tobit models (random effects are assumed Gaussian), n = 54 and T = 5. The endogenous
variable is the bid posted. Monetary incentives and Oath are dummy variables. Round (fixed) effects are controlled in the
estimation but omitted; results are available upon request. Wald joint nullity test is 81.01 with p < .0001.
price auction used in our treatments is likely to be unfamiliar to many bidders. They might not
immediately realize that bidding their true preferences is the weakly dominant strategy. By training
via practice rounds, bidders can learn the potential consequences of under- and over-bidding one’s
preferences for the good.
We train subjects in the three HG treatments with an additional induced values hypothetical
second-price auction, inserted between the quiz and the homegrown auction (see Table 1). Training
auctions are identical to those conducted in the IV-Baseline treatment: the auction is repeated
over 9 periods, implementing all permutations between private values and the whole demand curve
being induced in every period (see section 3.1). We choose to run the training auctions under a
hypothetical setting to avoid unwarranted wealth effects. Bidding is done in experimental currency,
without conversion into Euros whatever the homegrown treatment that follows. The introduction of
an IV hypothetical treatment between the quiz and the homegrown auctions is the only difference
between training experiments and those conducted in the previous section. The description of the
IV auction closely follows that of the homegrown auction, the only difference being: the repetition
of the game – 9 periods for the IV auction to enhance learning of how auctions work versus a
five-period HG auction – and the good sold. The wording of the auction, in particular, is identical,
calling the bids “prices” and the amount of the donation “market price”. The training phase is added
to the three treatments presented in the previous section and three new treatments are implemented:
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Figure 4: Empirical Distribution Functions of bids from trained bidders
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Note. Empirical distribution function of bids, pooling all five rounds of the HG experiment: each point along the curve gives
the proportion of observed bids that are lower than the one in abcissa.
HG-Baseline+training, HG-Monetary-incentives+training and HG-Oath+training.
5.1.1 Results
We look first at the effect of training in HG-Baseline+training and HG-Monetary-
incentives+training. EDFs of bids are provided in Figure 4.(a), along with those associated
with bidding behavior of untrained bidders observed in HG-Baseline+training and HG-Monetary-
incentives+training. The curves are marginally different for the monetary incentives treatments
with a greater but still small effect of training in the baseline treatments. Here, training seems
to increase low bids but decrease higher bids. Examining the summary statistics provided in Ta-
ble 8 shows again that training marginally affects bidding behavior. In HG-Baseline+training, the
number of bids above experimental earnings is lower with training than without training (21.1%
of bids compared to 47.7%). This in particular leads bidders to bid on average less (AC15.31) than
in HG-baseline (AC17.43). With incentives, trained bidders bid more (mean is AC4.23) than with
monetary incentives only (mean is AC2.98).
Result 6 Our initial results on bidding behavior remain robust. Training bidders does not change
bidding behavior in a homegrown value auction with and without monetary incentives.
Support. As expected given the observed EDFs, the differences as regards training are not signif-
icant: the p-value of our two-sample bootstrap mean difference test for the hypothetical setting is
: p = 0.494, and p = 0.476 for the real setting.
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Table 8: Homegrown bidding behavior after (IV) training
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 All rounds
Mean bid (AC) 14.61 15.25 14.41 16.72 15.58 15.31
HG-baseline Median bid (AC) 13.25 18.25 16.75 19.75 14.75 17.75
+training ] zero bids 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%)
] bids > gains 3 4 3 6 3 19 (21.1%)
Mean bid (AC) 3.33 5.08 4.42 4.17 4.17 4.23
HG-monetary Median bid (AC) 0.75 0.75 1.25 0.75 0.75 1
-incentives ] zero bids 5 4 5 5 5 24 (26.7%)
+training ] bids > gains 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%)
Average hyp.-real ratio with training 438.7% 300.2% 326.0% 401.0% 373.6% 361.9%
Mean bid (AC) 10.86 10.97 11.25 12.00 12.17 11.51
HG-Oath Median bid (AC) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
+training ] zero bids 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%)
] bids > gains 3 3 3 3 4 16 (17.8%)
Average oath-real ratio with training 326.1% 215.9% 254.5% 287.8% 291.8% 272.1%
Average oath-hyp. ratio with training 74.3% 71.9% 78.1% 71.8% 78.1% 75.2%
Note. For each Treatment (in column) and round (in column), the table provides bidding behavior in the homegrown (adopt a
dolphin) experiment for trained subjects: mean and median bid (first two rows for each treatment) ; number of zero bids (third
row) and bids above subject’s experimental earnings (fourth row). The last row of the upper part provides the ratio between
the average bids in the baseline and the average monetary-only bids. The last two rows of the lower part give the ratios between
the average bids after an oath and: first the average baseline bids, second the average monetary-only bids.
We now turn to the effect of training combined with an oath and compare bidding behavior
when subjects sign a truth-telling oath with and without training. As in HG-Oath, we found that
subjects expressed no reluctance to take the oath. Again, all subjects but one took an oath prior to
participating in the auction (94.5% acceptance rate).23 EDFs of bidding behavior are presented in
Figure 4.(b) (oath without training being in plain green and oath with training in plain blue). As
seen in the figure, the two curves are almost indistinguishable, suggesting that in oath treatments
training subjects with respect to the auction mechanism has no effect. Summary statistics on
aggregate bidding behavior presented in Table 8 confirm this finding and show that the mean bid
for all rounds is AC11.51 as compared to AC11.46 in the oath treatment without training (see Table
6).
Result 7 Bidding behavior of subjects in the HG-Oath+training treatment is not significantly dif-
ferent from bidding behavior in the oath-only treatment.
Support. Again, discrepancies in aggregate bidding behavior in HG-Oath and HG-Oath+training
23The statistical analysis is conducted on the whole sample. Results are similar when excluding the subject who
did not take the oath (detailed results available on request from the authors).
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are tested by implementing our unconditional mean difference bootstrap test. Mean difference is
not significant with p = .98.
In summary, results 4 and 5 still hold when training bidders with non-binding IV auctions
before bidding in the HG auctions. The decrease of average bidding behavior in HG-Oath+training
is significant as compared to HG-Baseline (one-sided mean difference bootstrap test: p = .036) and
HG-Baseline+training (one-sided mean difference bootstrap test: p = .089).
5.2 Oath with consequential wording
Our last treatment adds insights into the motives underlying the behavioral effects of the oath. Two
types of explanation as to why the oath works have been put forward in Section 3.3. On the one
hand, the guilt aversion explanation suggests that subjects tell the truth because they do not want
to fail to deliver what they believe others expect from them. On the other hand, the commitment-
based explanation, either using self-attribution theory or a preference for consistency, posits that
subjects tell the truth for internal reasons – concern for others playing no role. To investigate this
distinction further, we clearly point out in the procedure what the consequences of not telling the
truth would be for the research: results would be biased if dishonest answers were given (because
this is “what we observed in previous experimental studies”).
In practice, this experiment is identical to HG-Oath except that consequential wording is added
to the oath procedure. Consequential wording consists of one sentence added to the way the oath
is described to the subjects. When they arrive at the desk, the monitor mentions that (i) generally
speaking, in this kind of experiment, it has been observed in the past that people tend to provide
insincere answers and (ii) in this case our results are biased (note, again, that nothing is said about
what is going to happen later in the lab, i.e., experimental auctions). The oath is then introduced
to the subject as a way of avoiding such undesirable results, but still underlining that it is neither
mandatory for participating in the experiment, nor a condition of experimental earnings.24 If and
when the oath is signed, the experimenter adds ”good, now I’m relieved”, and the experiment runs
according to the procedure used in the baseline treatment.25 Hereafter, this treatment is called
HG-Oath+consequential-wording.
24In a sense, this last treatment can be related to cheap talk scripts. Cheap talk either provides directional or
neutral information: “most people typically state a value greater than what they would actually pay”; or “the amounts
most people say they will pay for a good are sometimes different from what they would actually be willing to pay for
the good.” The evidence on the success of cheap talk is mixed – lengthy worded directional cheap talk can remove
hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor, 1999), whereas neutral cheap talk can exacerbate the bias (Aadland and
Caplan, 2006).
25In the stated preferences literature, consequential usually means that the respondent understands that he or
she believes that he or she will probably pay what he or she says (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Here consequential
indicates that if the subject does not give honest answers, “our” results will be biased.
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Figure 5: Empirical Distribution Functions of bids after a consequentially worded oath
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Note. Empirical distribution function of bids, pooling all five rounds of the HG experiment: each point along the curve gives
the proportion of observed bids that are lower than the one in abscissa.
5.2.1 Results
First of all, we observe that all subjects agreed to take an oath prior to the auction. This re-
sult, combined with the acceptance rates obtained in HG-Oath and HG-Oath+training, leads to
an acceptance rate of 95.8% overall – subjects in all three treatments expressing no concern for
being put under pressure in the oath procedure. EDF of bids in HG-Oath+consequential-wording
is provided in Figure 5, along with the EDF of bids in HG-Oath. EDFs do not exhibit clear dif-
ferences, suggesting that consequential wording does not add any further effect to the standard
oath. A further comparison of mean bidding behavior confirms this finding. Table 9 presents
summary statistics on bidding behavior in HG-Oath+consequential-wording. Average behavior is
unchanged by the addition of consequential wording to the oath procedure: mean bid is AC12.33 in
HG-Oath+consequential-wording and AC11.46 in HG-Oath.
Result 8 Again our initial homegrown value results are robust. Bidding behavior of subjects in the
oath-with-consequential-wording treatment is not significantly different from bidding behavior in the
oath-only treatment.
Support. Mean bidding behavior is not significantly different from mean bidding behavior in the
oath-only treatment. The p-value from the two-sample mean difference bootstrap test is p = 0.731.
We finally pool data from all seven HG treatments in a random effects panel Tobit model.
Dummy variables are introduced to control for the HG-Monetary-incentives and HG-Oath treat-
ments (HG-Baseline being the referent) as well as total earnings and individual’s characteristics as
in the previous Tobit model. A dummy variable is added to control for trained bidders as well as
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Table 9: Homegrown bidding behavior with consequentially worded oath
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 All rounds
Mean bid (AC) 9.94 12.56 13.5 12.63 13 12.33
HG-Oath Median bid (AC) 6.5 10.5 12.25 12.5 12 10.5
+consequential ] zero bids 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%)
-wording ] bids > gains 3 3 5 4 5 20 (22.2%)
Average oath-real gap 301.2% 422.9% 425.9% 398.4% 565.2% 413.7%
Average oath-hypothetical gap 64.7% 65.5% 77.9% 72.7% 68.8% 70.7%
Note. For each round (in column), the table provides bidding behavior in the homegrown (adopt a dolphin) experiment: mean
and median bid (first two rows for each treatment) ; number of zero bids (third row) and bids above subject’s experimental
earnings (fourth row). The last two rows of the table gives the ratios between the average bids after an oath and: first the
average baseline bids, second the average monetary-only bids.
two dummy variables that control for interaction terms between training and oath and training and
monetary incentives. Last, we add a dummy variable that indicates that consequential wording has
been used as a complement to the oath (the dummy variable controlling for oath is set to one for
this treatment). Results are presented in Table 10. Econometric results confirm unambiguously our
unconditional statistics results on aggregate bidding behavior. First, the parameter associated with
monetary incentives is negative and significant, indicating that subjects bid on average AC16.5 less
when monetary incentives are binding than in baseline (p < .001)). Second, the dummy variable
accounting for oath is also highly significant and negative: subject bid on average AC6.61 less when
they are committed by taking an oath as compared to baseline (p = .01). Third, the parameter
associated with trained bidders is not significant (p = .43) ) and this is also true for oath and mon-
etary incentives interaction terms (p = .69 and p = .17 respectively). Fourth, adding consequential
wording to the oath procedure has no additional effects on bidding behavior (p = .62).
From the theory of commitment perspective, an oath is an extreme type of commitment that
binds the subject to tell the truth. Result 8 suggests that adding explicit warnings about the
consequences of lying for the research at stake (and consequently for the monitor, who is identified
in our setting as one member of the research team), “our results would be biased”, does not make
any difference. This makes guilt aversion an unlikely candidate to explain why the oath has a
powerful effect on bidding behavior. However, applying the theory of commitment leads to the
plausible explanation that people behave differently under oath because the oath commits them
to tell the truth, not because they dislike the consequences for others of possible lies. This last
result is consistent with Vanberg (2008)’s conclusion in the context of promises through pre-play
communication (see Section 3.3).
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Table 10: Overall HG bidding behavior – Panel Tobit estimations
Variable Parameter estimate P-value
Treatment dummies
Constant term 4.91 0.505
Monetary incentives -16.54 0.000
Oath -6.61 0.010
Earnings 0.37 0.330
Training -2.00 0.430
Training × oath 1.47 0.688
Training × monetary incentives 5.11 0.166
Consequential wording 1.29 0.622
Round dummies yes
Individual’s characteristics
Age -0.03 0.835
Male -1.53 0.292
Participated to other experiments -1.13 0.459
Experience with auctions websites 1.61 0.008
Knows WWF 0.34 .878
Agrees with WWF actions 1.70 0.002
Knows WWF’s dolphin adoption programme -.87 .705
σu (sd.) 7.37 (.51)
σe (sd.) 3.29 (.11)
Log likelihood -1688.93
Note. Individual random effects Tobit models (random effects are assumed Gaussian), n = 126 and T = 5. The endogenous
variable is the bid posted. Monetary incentives and Oath are dummy variables. Training is introduced as a dummy variable and
training effects specific to monetary incentives and oath are controlled by treatment-specific dummy variables. Consequential
wording is introduced with a dummy variable (and oath is set to one for these data). Round (fixed) effects are controlled in
the estimation but omitted; results are available upon request. Wald joint nullity test is 114.28 with p < .0001.
6 Conclusion
Incentive compatible mechanisms use external incentives to elicit the truth from people – true types,
true bids, true preferences. But eliciting truthful behavior still requires people to be committed to
telling the truth. Placing a person in a “market-like” valuation context – whether hypothetical
or real, in the lab or in the field – seems insufficient to generate the internal commitment needed
for sincere bidding. What is needed is a commitment device such as the oath, the centuries-old
mechanism designed to align internal incentives with social goals.
Herein we study preference elicitation under oath. In induced valuation treatments, the oath-
only treatment induced sincere bidding behavior in the second-price auction; the other treatments
did not. In the homegrown value treatments, the oath did its job by inciting bidders to lower bids
on the high end of the distribution and increase bids on the low end. Such behavior is consistent
with the notions that bidders took their budget constraints and participation constraints seriously.
Having subjects signing an oath on one’s honor to “tell the truth and provide honest answers” before
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bidding induced more rational economic behavior. These results were robust to additional training
with the auction mechanism and additional consequential wording stressing the consequences of not
telling the truth. Our findings hold promise, opening the way for better preference elicitation of
non-market goods, like environmental protection.
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A Panel Tobits on IV-bidding behavior – Full results Table
Variable IV-Monetary-incentives IV-Baseline IV-Oath-Monetary-incentives IV-Oath
n = 162 n = 162 n = 162 n = 162
Parameter estimates
(p-value)
νit .855 .788 .756 .969
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Constant .480 4.44 8.99 -6.1
(.945) (.394) (.044) (.182)
φ2 7.33 3.00 4.49 8.21
(.261) (.528) (.273) (.053)
φ3 17.2 11.4 7.94 8.35
(.008) (.016) (.053) (.049)
φ4 12.4 9.56 5.88 6.94
(.059) (.045) (.152) (.102)
φ5 5.98 15.9 8.11 13.8
(.360) (.001) (.048) (.001)
φ6 17.8 11.9 10.9 12.0
(.006) (.012) (.007) (.005)
φ7 20.8 14.1 14.2 10.6
(.002) (.003) (.001) (.012)
φ8 13.2 11.8 15.3 6.65
(.042) (.013) (.000) (.115)
φ9 10.2 18.7 13.9 11.8
(.117) (.000) (.001) (.005)
σu 2.40 9.19 4.88 8.72
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
σ 19.55 14.25 12.31 12.64
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Log-likelihood -675.11597 -659.40375 -640.24359 -641.81659
Note. Individual random effects Tobit models. The random effects are assumed normal; round dummies included in all
regressions. The endogenous variable is the bid posted. vit denotes the induced private value.The columns report results from
separate regressions on the IV treatments. The number of observations used in the regression is provided in the second row.
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B Screen shot of the adoption page
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C Supplementary material
C.1 Quiz questions
The four possible answers apppear just after the question. The right answer is the first one in the
list. In the experiment, the order of answers is identical within sessions but randomized between
sessions.
1. In what place did the delegates of the “Third Estate” meet, after the king rejected their list
of grievances?
The “salle du jeu de Paume”, The National Assembly, Versailles, The Senate
2. What is the name of the current Director of the International Monetary Fund?
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Alan Greenspan, Alain Juppé, Pascal Lamy
3. Who wrote “Germinal” ?
Emile Zola, Gustave Flaubert, Guy de Maupassant, Honoré de Balzac
4. What is the capital of Australia?
Canberra, Sydney, Perth, Auckland
5. Who is the writer who said “l’enfer c’est les autres.” (“Hell is other people”)
Jean-Paul Sartre, Gérard de Nerval, Boris Vian, Sacha Guitry
6. In France, in the event of vacancy or impeachment, who decides in the place of the President?
The President of the Senate, The Prime Minister, The President of the national Assembly,
The Minister of justice (Le Garde des Sceaux = keeper of the seals)
7. What is the American state with the largest population?
California, Florida, New York, Texas
8. In the novel “Gulliver’s travels”, Gulliver discovers fantasy countries. What is special about
people from Lilliput ?
Their height is no more than six inches, All are giants, Their head is that of an animal, They
are hugely rich
9. Who wrote the “Iliade” znd “Odyssey” ’ ?
Homer, Socrates, Plato, Virgil
10. The date at which State and Church were separated is:
A bill of 1905, The Concordat of 1801, A bill of 1889, The Lateran agreement of 1929
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11. In chemistry, what are the letters used to symbolize the acidity of a liquid?
Ph, Na, Ca, Ba
12. Which of the following writers, who would have been able to meet Jean-Jacques Rousseau ?
Voltaire, Baudelaire, Hugo, Zola
13. Which of the following designates a word or sentence that says the same thing as what was
said before?
A pleonasm, A euphemism, A metaphor, An understatement
14. Before setting in Paris in 1944, the temporary government of the French Republic was:
In Algiers, In London, In the free zone, In the occupied zone
15. Who was the first woman to become Prime Minister (1991-1992) under President François
Mitterrand?
Edith Cresson, Simon Veil, Martine Aubry, A woman has never occupied this position
16. Signed on 25 March 1957, this treaty is the starting point of the European Economic Com-
munity (CEE):
The Rome treaty, the Versailles treaty, The Paris treaty, The Maastricht treaty
17. The human body’s is composed of . . .
60% water, 20% water, 40% water, 80% water
18. What is the new regulation introduced by the Schengen agreement?
the free circulation of people, The European flag, The implementation of the Euro, The Euro-
pean constitution project
19. How do you say “A vos souhaits!” (“Bless you !”) in English?
[A vos souhaits] !, Sorry !, Good bye !, Thank you !
20. Who wrote: “Les sanglots longs ; Des violons de l’automne ; Blessent mon coeur ; D’une
langueur monotone”?
Verlaine, Baudelaire, Musset, Rimbaud
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C.2 Instructions common to all experiments
[changes implemented according to treatment appear in brackets.]
You’re involved in an experiment in which you can earn money. The amount you will earn will
depend on your own decisions as well as the decisions of other participants.
Before starting the experiment, we will ask you to answer a few questions aimed at getting to
know you better (your age, your gender, your occupation, . . . ). All this information as well as
your monetary earnings will be kept anonymous and confidential.
[computerized administrative questionnaire answered at this point ]
Thank you.
Experiment procedure
[In HG Experiments only:] The experiment involves two [Training: three] parts. The instructions
describing the procedure for each part will be distributed and read aloud before each part.
How will you take your decisions?
Your screen is divided into three areas:
The upper part shows all the information you need to take your decisions.
The middle part allows you to take your decisions, by pressing buttons displayed.
The bottom part provides a reminder of your past decisions and profits.
Payment of your earnings
Your earnings during the experiment will be expressed in ecu (for Experimental Currency Unit).
These earnings are converted into Euros according to the rate: 3 ecu = 1 e . A fixed fee equal to
10e is added to this payoff. You will be paid privately the corresponding monetary payoff in cash
at the end of the experiment.
For obvious scientific reasons, it is mandatory not to speak during the experiment.
Unfortunately, we will have to ask any participant not complying with this rule to leave the room
without any opportunity to take potential earnings.
It is very important you understand the procedure of the experiment. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand, someone will come and answer you. Thank you for following these rules.
Thank you for your participation.
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C.3 Instructions for the IV-Experiment
[The instructions below are used for the IV-Baseline treatment.]
At the beginning of this part, two groups composed of 9 participants each are formed.
Each participant belongs to the same group throughout the part.
Overview. You will be participating in an auction in which you are a buyer. Your have to offer, at
each round, a price in ecu to buy a good. The experiment monitor will re-acquire this good from
you. There will be several rounds of bidding. The outcome of each auction in each round
has no influence on [Monetary incentives: directly influences] how much you will get
paid at the end of the experiment.
Procedure for each round
Each round has 8 steps.
Step 1. Each bidder looks at his or her resale value on his or her screen. We term resale value
the price in ecu the monitor will pay to buy back a unit of the good that is purchased in
the auction. The resale values of different participants in a group can be different.
Once you have looked at your resale value, press the OK button;
Step 2. Each bidder then submits a bid in ecu to buy one unit of the good. To do this, scroll down
the until you find the price you want to submit. Then press the OK button below the scroll
bar to confirm your choice;
Step 3. The monitor ranks the bids from highest to lowest. In event of ties, the ranking is drawn
randomly. For instance:
n° 1 fs.l ecu Highest bid
n° 2 df.g ecu
n° 3 za.f ecu
n° 4 qs.a ecu
n° 5 qs.a ecu
n° 6 nj.h ecu
n° 7 hh.m ecu
n° 8 ht.t ecu
n° 9 ky.l ecu Lowest bid
Step 4. The second highest bid (bid n°2) determines the market price. In the above example, the
second highest bid is df.g ecu so the market price would be df.g ecu:
44Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.43
n° 1 fs.l ecu
n° 2 df.g ecu Second highest bid: market price
n° 3 za.f ecu
n° 4 qs.a ecu
n° 5 qs.a ecu
n° 6 nj.h ecu
n° 7 hh.m ecu
n° 8 ht.t ecu
n° 9 ky.l ecu
Step 5. The buyer who bid the highest price (the buyer ranked n°1) purchases one unit of the good
at the market price. In the above example the buyer who bid fs.l ecu purchases one unit of
the good that costs df.g ecu.
Step 6. Buyer n°1 then sells the unit back to the monitor. The price of this transaction is the resale
value listed for that round on his/her screen. The profit in ecu bidder n°1 earns for that
round is the difference between the resale value and the market price:
profit = Resale value - market price
Important note. You can have negative profits: if you buy a unit of the good and the resale
value is less than the market price, your profits will be negative.
Step 7. All bidders at or below the market price (buyers n°2 to n°9) buy nothing, they make zero
profit for that round.
Step 8. End of the round. Your profit in ecu in that round appears on your screen. Press the OK
button once you have read it. Your screen announces whether a new round is about to start,
or whether the experiment is over.
Earnings for this part
Your payoff in ecu for this part is 0 whatever your earnings at each period. [Monetary incen-
tives: your payoff in ecu for this part is set equal to the sum of your earnings at each period.]
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C.4 IV: Pre-experiment questionnaire
1. Groups are reformed in each round.
2YES 2NO
2. Each group is composed of participants.
3. At the beginning of each round, all participants belonging to my group are attributed the
same resale value.
2YES 2NO
4. When I make a bid, I can bid any amount I wish.
2YES 2NO
5. The market price is set by the bid of the highest bidder in my group.
2YES 2NO
6. If my bid is the highest bid and is equal to RR.U ecu and the second highest bid in my group
is GG.K ecu, then I buy the unit of the good.
2YES 2NO
If yes, I pay: for the good.
7. If I purchase a unit of the good and my resale value is greater than the market price, I will
make positive profits.
2YES 2NO
8. The monetary payoff I will get at the end of the experiment depends on the amount of ecu I
earned in the auction.
2YES 2NO
If you are surprised by some answers, please ask questions.
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C.5 Instructions for HG experiments
Procedure for the first part
The first part involves 20 rounds. At each round, you have to answer a question by choosing
one out of four possible answers. To choose an answer, click on the corresponding button. Only
one out of the four answers is correct.
• If the answer you choose is the correct one, your earnings for this round are 2 ecu.
• If the answer you choose is not the correct one, your earnings for this round are 0 ecu.
At the end of this part, a message displays your earnings in each round. Your payoff in ecu for
the first part is the sum in ecu you earned in each period. Press OK once you’ve read this.
**************
[In HG+training experiments, the instructions used for IV-Baseline, along with the pre-
experiment questionnaire, are inserted here.]
**************
47Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.43
Procedure for the second [training: third ] part
The following information is required in order to fully understand this part.
The World Wide Fund for Nature, better known as the WWF, is an international non-
governmental organisation for the protection of nature and of the environment, fully committed
to sustainable development. The head office is in Gland, Switzerland, and the association has more
than 4.7 million members worldwide, with an operational network in 96 countries. It is a private
organisation aimed at protecting wild animals and their habitats as well as nature in general, which
it does by collecting funds for specific programs. Principally, it keeps a watchful eye on whether
international regulations are being respected, restores damaged natural areas and provides training.
As a way of financing its environmental protection activities, the WWF offers private individuals
the opportunity to adopt an animal from an endangered species. The funds thereby collected enable
the WWF to continue protecting the environment and preserving species diversity.
During this part, we ask you to imagine that you were taking part [Monetary incentives: you are
going to take part] in this operation by making a donation, which would be [Monetary incentives:
will be] deducted from your experimental earnings, to adopt a dolphin. The sums collected during
this part would be [Monetary incentives: will be] passed on by us to the WWF, to support their
environmental protection activities. Your donation to the WWF would be [Monetary incentives:
will be] recorded on an official certificate, which would be [Monetary incentives: will be] sent to your
home address. We ask you to make your decisions as if, in this part, we were genuinely offering
you the opportunity to adopt a dolphin, according to the procedure described below. The decisions
made during this part are not, however, taken into account when calculating your Euro experimental
earnings. In actual fact, regardless of your decisions, you will not be adopting a dolphin and your
experimental earnings will not be affected. [Monetary incentives: We will genuinely make it possible
for you to adopt a dolphin if you so decide, according to the procedure described below. The decisions
made during this part are taken into account when calculating your Euro experimental earnings. This
means that if you adopt a dolphin, your donation will be deducted from your earnings.]
Description of the part
At the beginning of this part, two groups of 9 participants are formed. Each participant will
belong to the same group throughout the part. One single participant from each group would be
given [Monetary incentives: will be given] the opportunity to adopt a dolphin through the WWF.
This part is composed of 5 rounds. During each round, you will take part in an auction, playing
the part of a buyer. In each group, the participant offering the highest bid wins the auction, and
the market price for the round is the second highest bid.
At the end of the part, one round alone will be drawn at random from the 5. In each group,
the participant who won the auction during the round drawn would donate [Monetary
incentives: will donate] money to the WWF by adopting a dolphin. The amount of this
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donation would be [Monetary incentives: will be] the market price for the round drawn.
This donation would be [Monetary incentives: will be deducted from the experimental earnings of
the participant who undertook [Monetary incentives: undertakes] the adoption. The earnings for
this part for the participant winning the auction in the round drawn would be [Monetary incentives:
are] therefore negative and would represent [Monetary incentives: represent] the donation that was
[Monetary incentives: is] given to the WWF.
Procedure for the part
Before the part begins, you will receive a message showing your earnings in Ecu from the preceding
part, the corresponding amount in Euros and your total earnings in Euros. This total includes the
lump sum of AC10. Press OK when you have read this information.
You will receive a second message reminding you of the description of the part. Please confirm
that you have read this information by pressing the button on the screen.
Procedure for a round
Summary. You are participating in an auction, playing the part of a buyer. Monetary values in
this auction are expressed in Euros. Your role consists of bidding a purchase price in Euros. This
price is the donation you are prepared to make to help the WWF in its environmental protection
activities by adopting a dolphin. In each group, the participant winning the auction for a given
round is the one whose bid is highest, and the market price for that round is the second highest bid.
Each round consists of 7 steps.
Etape 1. A window will open on your screen, with a detailed description of how the WWF protects dol-
phins, as well as the documents sent to people adopting a dolphin. Please read this information
carefully.
Etape 2. Each buyer bids a price in Euros. To do this, scroll down on the right-hand side of the
information page until you find the amount you want to bid. Then press the OK button
below to confirm your choice.
Etape 3. All the bids from your group are ranked from highest to lowest by the computer running the
experiment. If there are identical bids, the ranking of identical bidders is determined by a
random draw. For example:
n° 1 fs.l Euro Highest bid
n° 2 df.g Euro
n° 3 za.f Euro
n° 4 qs.a Euro
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n° 5 qs.a Euro
n° 6 nj.h Euro
n° 7 hh.m Euro
n° 8 ht.t Euro
n° 9 ky.l Euro Lowest bid
Etape 4. The highest bidder (ranked no.l) wins the auction. In the preceding example, the person who
bid fs.1 Euro won the auction.
Etape 5. The second highest bid (purchasing price no.2) determines the market price. In the above
example, the second highest bid is df.g Euro and the market price for the round is therefore
df.g Euro.
n° 1 fs.l Euro
n° 2 df.g Euro Second highest bid
n° 3 za.f Euro
n° 4 qs.a Euro
n° 5 qs.a Euro
n° 6 nj.h Euro
n° 7 hh.m Euro
n° 8 ht.t Euro
n° 9 ky.l Euro
End of the part
At the end of the part, you will receive a message giving the result of the auction for your group
for each of the 5 rounds: an initial message will tell you whether or not you have won this round of
the auction. If you have won this round of the auction, a second message will give you the market
price for the round.
Next, you will receive a message giving the round drawn at random from the 5 rounds of the
part. In each group, the participant winning the auction for the round drawn would undertake
[Monetary incentives: undertakes] a WWF adoption. The amount of this donation would be [Mon-
etary incentives: is] the market price for the round drawn. This donation would be [Monetary
incentives: is] deducted from the experimental earnings of those participants adopting a dolphin.
Example: Suppose for example that you won round 3 of the auction and that the market price
for round 3 was mm.i Euros. If round 3 is drawn, you would make [Monetary incentives: will make]
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a donation to the WWF by adopting a dolphin. The amount of your donation would be [Monetary
incentives: will be] mm.i Euros. This amount would be [Monetary incentives: will be] deducted from
your experimental earnings.
Important Note. Your donation to the WWF could [Monetary incentives: can] be greater than
your total experimental earnings. If you win the auction round drawn and if the market price for the
round drawn is greater than your total experimental earnings, your donation to the WWF would
be [Monetary incentives: will be] greater than your total experimental earnings. In this event,
you would have to [Monetary incentives: will have to] pay the difference in cash, or by any
other means of payment, at the end of the experiment. We would [Monetary incentives:
will] pay this sum to the WWF, as part of your full donation.
Example: Returning to the previous example, and supposing that you won round 3 of the auction,
that the market price for round 3 is mm.i Euros and that round 3 is drawn. You would therefore
make [Monetary incentives: will make] a donation to the WWF by adopting a dolphin and the
amount of your donation would be [Monetary incentives: is] mm.i Euros. If your total experimental
earnings are less than mm.i Euros, you would have to [Monetary incentives: will have to] pay the
difference at the end of the experiment.
The participants who do not win the auction round drawn would not undertake [Monetary
incentives: do not undertake] an adoption and would not make [Monetary incentives: do not make]
a donation to the WWF.
End of the experiment
At the end of the experiment, the participants who had won the auction would be asked [Monetary
incentives: will be asked] to give us their personal address. The amount of their donation would be
[Monetary incentives: will be] paid by us on their behalf to the WWF, to support their environmental
protection activities. Those people adopting a dolphin would receive [Monetary incentives: will
receive], at the address given, an adoption certificate and a photograph acknowledging their donation
to the WWF. [Monetary incentives: We undertake to respect confidentiality, and will only
use this information for the purposes of the donation.]
Calculating your experimental earnings
Your experimental earnings in Euros are the amount given at the beginning of the second part.
Your decisions in that part are not taken into account when calculating your experimental earnings
in Euros. [Monetary incentives: If you have adopted a dolphin, these earnings are reduced by the
amount of your donation. If the amount of your donation is greater than your experimental earnings,
we will ask you to pay the difference in cash at the end of the experiment in order to make up the
full amount of your donation.]
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C.6 HG experiment: Pre-experiment questionnaire
1. Each group is composed of participants.
2. When I bid, I can bid any amount I like.
2YES 2NO
3. The market price is determined by the highest bid in my group.
2YES 2NO
4. If my bid is the highest bid and is RR.U Euros, and if the second highest bid in my group is
GG.K Euros, I win this round of the auction.
2YES 2NO
The market price for this round is .
5. 1.If this round is drawn at random, I would make [(Monetary incentives: will make] a donation
to the WWF by adopting a dolphin.
2YES 2NO
If yes. . .
. . . the amount of my donation will be [Monetary-incentives: would be] .
. . . the amount of my donationwill be [Monetary-incentives: would be] deducted from my
experimental earnings.
2YES 2NO
. . . if the market price is greater than my total experimental earnings, I would have to pay
the difference out of my own pocket at the end of the experiment?
2YES 2NO
6. The amount earned in Euros that will be paid to me at the end of the experiment depends
on my decisions during this part.
2YES 2NO
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C.7 HG experiment: Post experiment questions
Debriefing questions appear one at a time, together with the answers in parentheses.
• Do you belong to an environmental association? (YES/NO)
• Did you know of the WWF before taking part in this experiment? (YES/NO)
• Did you know of the WWF’s dolphin adoption programme before taking part in this experi-
ment? (YES/NO)
• Have you previously adopted an animal to help an association for the protection of nature?
(YES/NO)
• What is your opinion of the WWF’s activities?
(totally opposed, opposed, moderately opposed, no opinion, moderately in favour, in favour,
totally in favour)
• Have you ever previously bought or sold an object on an online auction site of the ebay type?
(YES/NO)
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